- WHY do we use OLG?
 - + agents don't live infinitely (they die).
 - + new agents are born over time.
 - + Considers the dynamic interaction between generations [Olders' decisions affect youngers]
 - + tractable alternative to infinitely lived representative agent.
 - + Break First Welfare Theorem.
 - + Break Ricardian equivalence and the implication that $K^* < K^9$
 - + Real world implications: existence of rational bubbles & pension schemes.

without any behavioral assumptions on preferences.

- * The number of generations "N" is determined by "N" different types of agents (or behaviors) that one wants to show.
- The Environment
 - + people live for N=2 periods (Old and young). Additively seperable utility: agents of gen. $t: U(C_t^{\gamma}, C_{t+1}^0) = U(C_t^{\gamma}) + U(C_{t+1}^0)$
 - + No "Altruism": no bequests.
 - + for simplicity assume zero population growth. (N young, Nold)
 - + pure exchange economy: abstract from production function.
- Conclusion
 - + models can be solved for stationary/nun-stationary equilibria.

- First, remember: 1st welfare theorem: C.E.
$$\Rightarrow$$
 P.O. (Icl non saturation)
2nd \Rightarrow : P.O. \Rightarrow C.E. (concavity of u)

gen
$$t=1$$
:

young, old;

young old;

young old;

young old;

young old;

young old;

young old;

A competetive eq. is callocation $\{c_t^{\gamma}, c_{t+1}^{\circ}, a_{t+1}^{\gamma}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and prices $\{r_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ 5.t.:

$$\begin{array}{lll} \begin{array}{lll} (c_{t+1}) & & & & \\ (c_{t+1}) & & \\ (c$$

$$= > EE: \frac{u(c_t^3)}{u(c_{t+1}^0)} = (1+v_{t+1}) = -\frac{c_{t+1}^0 - e_{t+1}^0}{c_t^3 - e_t^3} = -\frac{I_{t+1}}{I_{t+1}}$$

$$\Rightarrow \qquad u(z_{t} + e_{t}^{y}) \neq_{t} + u(Z_{t+1} + e_{t+1}^{o}) Z_{t+1} = 0 \qquad (*)$$

$$(I) \qquad 0 = \sum_{t=1}^{N} \alpha_{t+1} \implies \alpha_{t+1} = 0 \qquad \forall t \qquad , \qquad T_{t}^{\prime} + T_{t}^{\circ} = 0 \qquad \Longrightarrow \qquad T_{t}^{\prime} = T = -T_{t}^{\circ} \quad \forall t$$

$$NC_{t}^{\prime} + NC_{t}^{\circ} = Ne_{t}^{\prime} + Ne_{t}^{\circ}$$

now, sup.
$$u(c) = \ln c$$
, $w_t = \omega \times \omega = \omega_t$.

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$$u(c) = \ln c$$
, $w_t = \omega \times \omega = \omega_t$.

$$v(c) = \ln c$$
, $v(c) = \ln c$, $v(c) = \omega_t$.

$$v(c) = \ln c$$
, $v(c) = \omega_t$.

$$v(c) = \ln c$$
, $v(c) = \omega_t$.

$$\Longrightarrow$$
 C.E. is not pareto optimal. (works for $\Delta \in (0, \Delta)$)

This is called "Dynamic Inefficiency" - Due to the missing market

$$\overset{\star}{\Longrightarrow} \quad u(z_{t}+e_{t}') \; \boldsymbol{z}_{t} - u(-\boldsymbol{z}_{t+1}+e_{t+1}') \boldsymbol{z}_{t+1} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boldsymbol{z}_{t+1} = \boldsymbol{G}(\boldsymbol{z}_{t})$$
 [if $u(\cdot)$ is invertible,...]

the sequence
$$\{Z_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$$
 gives the non-stationary eq.

+ Now, introduce government, but not yet debt:

EE:
$$\frac{\omega_{+}^{0}T}{\omega_{-}^{0}T} = 1 + r \qquad \frac{\partial r}{\partial T} > 0$$

- again introducing taxes might be pareto improving if we have dynamic inefficiency.

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{q_t} = 1 + r_{t+1}$$

- government's budget constraint:
$$b_t + T_t + T_t = b_{t-1}$$
 [mixed financing]

old
$$s : C_{t}^{0} = \omega_{t}^{0} - T_{t}^{0} + b_{t-1}$$

young
$$S$$
: $C_t^{\gamma} = \omega_t^{\gamma} - T_t^{\gamma} - htbt$ [only the young buy the bond]

- market clearing for bonds: Supply of bonds:
$$S_t = C_t^y - W_t^y + T_t^y$$
 demand for bonds: $S_t = C_t^y - W_t^y + T_t^y$

=> [market clearing condition]:
$$C_t^y = \omega_t^y + T_t^o - b_{t-1}$$

- in eq. :
$$\frac{1}{q_t} = 1 + r_{t+1} = \frac{u(c_t^{y})}{u(c_{t+1}^{o})}$$

$$C_{t}^{\circ} = \omega_{t}^{\circ} - T_{t}^{\circ} + b_{t-1}$$

$$C_t^o = \omega_t^o - T_t^o + b_{t-1}$$

$$C_t^y = \omega_t^y - T_t^y - b_{t-1}$$
Note that $T \otimes b_{t-1}$ can not be too large.

- Now, supp.
$$T=0$$
: if $r_{t+k}=0$ -> debt would be constant overtine = bo

if $r_{t+k}>0$ -> X

if
$$r_{t+k} > 0 \longrightarrow X$$
if $r_{t+k} < 0 \longrightarrow V$ debt converges to zero

- A has price
$$P_{t+1} = P_{t+1}$$
 in period to and pays dividend $d_{t+1} = d_{t+1}$

- individual budget constraint:
$$C_t^y = \omega_t^y - \rho_t \alpha_{t+1}$$

$$C_{t+1}^0 = \omega_{t+1}^0 + (\rho_{t+1} + d) \alpha_{t+1}$$

- Market clearing:
$$a_{t+1} = A$$
 [agg. demand of asset = agg. Supply]

interest rate is given by:
$$\frac{u(c_t)}{u(c_{t+1})} = 1 + r_{t+1}$$

the price sequence satisfies:
$$l_t = \frac{l_{t+1} + d}{l_{t+1}}$$

- let us only investigate stationary eq.:

$$P = \frac{P+d}{l+r}$$
, $C^{y} = \omega^{y} - PA$, $C^{0} = \omega^{0} + (P+d)A$

$$\frac{u(\omega-\rho A)}{u(\omega^{0}+(\rho+d)A)} = 1+r = 1+\frac{d}{r} \implies \rho = \frac{d}{r} \quad \text{price is discounted future dividends.}$$

- Suppose
$$d=0$$
, $u(c)=\ln c: \frac{w-pA}{w^2+pA}=1 \Rightarrow w-pA=w+pA \Rightarrow p=\frac{w-w}{2A}\neq 0$!

* This is known as "Rational Bubble" where d=0 and $p\neq 0$.

Note that consumption is equal in each period => eff., not necessarily a bad thing.

- Generally, rational bubble can rise whenever r<g.
- bursting happens when people start to think P=0.

Applications: Macro -> public finance [Diamond 1965]

the role of money [samuelson 1958] - Monetary economics

pension schemes

growth (demographic transition, capital accumulation,...)

consumption smoothing & life cycle theories

(sunspot equilibria)

Finance ____ liquidity & bubbles

market incompleteness & effect on hedging

check with Ramtin later for the controversy...